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This paper explores the possibility that technological capabilities, to lead to development, 
need to be accompanied by a broader set of “social capabilities”, reflecting not only the 
quality of governance but also the spread of values, beliefs and institutions that encourage 
members of society to actively contribute to the development process.  To investigate this 
issue, a set of empirical indicators, reflecting the capabilities that have been emphazised in the 
literature as being  important for development, was identified. We also take into account the 
possibility that these capabilities (and their impact) may be conditioned by historically given 
factors (related to, for example, geography, demography and history). The paper uses factor 
analysis to analyse the question of how these indicators interrelate  and  explores their 
relationship with economic development. We find that technological and social capabilities 
are indeed strongly related and, moreover, strongly correlated with economic development. 
The same does not apply for the second factor suggested by the analysis, which  mainly 
reflects the character of countries’ political systems. Thus it is more important economically 
what countries do than how they decide on it. A strong negative relationship with 
development was found for the third factor, reflecting  the combined effect of high fertility 
rates, low education and high frequency of serious disease. Arguably, this contributes to a 
“vicious circle” that makes it difficult for some very poor countries, especially in the tropics, 
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For a long time many economists believed that economic catch-up was mainly a question of 
investing sufficiently in machinery and other tangible factors. At least this was the main 
message that could be derived from the dominant theory of economic growth, the so-called 
neoclassical theory, developed in the 1950s by Robert Solow and others (Solow 1956, see 
Fagerberg  1994 for an extended discussion). Moreover,  the theory was based on the 
assumption that the returns to capital accumulation would  be  higher in poor than in rich 
environments, leading to the prediction that poor countries under otherwise equal conditions 
would have higher rates of investment and economic growth than rich countries. Hence, 
following this approach economic development should be easy. 
 
In reality it wasn’t so easy, as evidenced by the fact that there has been very little convergence 
in GDP per capita between rich and poor countries during the last few decades (Fagerberg and 
Srholec 2005). In fact the distance in levels of productivity and income between the poorest 
and the riches countries in the world are much higher today than a few centuries ago (Landes 
1998).  As this evidence became more widely acknowledged, the received wisdom about the 
subject started to be questioned and new theories emerged focusing on intangibles, such as 
knowledge, learning, innovation and human capital, as the drivers of growth and development 
(Lucas 1988, Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992). Following these approaches the failure 
of many poor countries to develop and catch up with the rich ones should not primarily be 
seen as the result of too low investments in physical capital. Rather, the problem was assumed 
to relate to a lacking ability in these countries to exploit the worldwide pool of knowledge to 
their own benefit. 
 
Arguably, this change of focus gave birth to more questions than answers. For example, why 
is it that many poor countries do not succeed in exploiting knowledge to increase productivity 
and welfare?  What are the critical capabilities that poor countries need to develop in order to 
succeed? Our hunch is that there is no “quick technological fix” to the development puzzle.  It 
is for example not sufficient to have access to knowledge about, say, the principles behind a 
certain technology, because this knowledge needs to be exploited to make a difference for 
economic development. Such exploitation requires command of other types of knowledge or 
capabilities as well, the development of which may be costly and take time.  
 
In the next section we consider some of the existing literature on this issue and outline a 
strategy for how to deal with it empirically. This leads in the third section to the detection of a 
set of empirical indicators reflecting the capabilities that have been recognized in the literature 
as important for development. We also take into account the possibility that these capabilities 
(and their impact) may be conditioned by historically given factors related to, for example, 
geography, demography and history. The paper applies factor analysis to analyse the question 
of how these variables interrelate and explores the relationship with economic development. 
The final section considers the lessons from this exercise. 
2. Lessons from the literature
1 
 
                                                 
1 The discussion in this section draws on Fagerberg and Srholec (2008a,b). 3 
 
Some of  the first systematic attempts to study the relationships between technology, 
capabilities and development were made by economic historians who wanted to understand 
why some countries managed to catch up with the richer ones while other countries continued 
to be poor. Half a century ago Alexander Gerschenkron pointed out that technological catch 
up, although potentially highly lucrative, is also extremely challenging (Gerschenkron 1962).  
He saw this as the result of the cumulative nature of technological advance: With time 
technology became more sophisticated and the scale of operation larger, making entry more 
demanding.  Based on a study of the performance of a number of European countries relative 
to the then leading country – Great Britain – he concluded that to succeed in technological 
catch up, less advanced countries had to develop what he called “new institutional 
instruments”, e.g., organizations capable of identifying the most promising options ahead and 
muster the necessary resources for exploiting these opportunities.
2  
 
More recently the view that  technological catch-up by late-comers is far from easy  has 
received  further backing from a series of empirical studies of industrialization processes in 
Asia and Latin-America (Kim 1980, Fransman 1982, Fransman and King 1984, Dahlman et 
al. 1987, Lall 1987). One case which received much attention was the rise of Korea from 
being one of the poorest countries in the world to a first world technological powerhouse in 
just three decades. Linsu Kim, who made the authoritative study on the subject, suggested the 
concept “technological capability” (Kim 1980, 1997) as an analytical device to interpret the 
Korean evidence. He defined it as “the ability to make effective use of technological 
knowledge in efforts to assimilate, use, adapt and change existing technologies.” (Kim 1997, 
p. 4).
  3 Hence, the concept includes not only organized R&D, which arguably is a small 
activity in many developing countries, but also other capabilities needed for the commercial 
exploitation of technology. As has become common in the literature he considered three 
aspects of it: production capability, investment capability and innovation capability.  Kim’s 
assessment was that the requirements should be expected to become more stringent, in 
particular with respect to innovation capabilities, as countries climb up the development 
ladder. Thus, for a firm or country in the process of catching up, the appropriate level of 
technological capability is a moving target, in constant need of improvement. 
 
The concept “technological capability” has since been used in a large number of studies at 
various levels of aggregation (see Romijn 1999 and  Figueiredo 2006 for overviews). 
Although initially developed for analyses of firms, it has also been applied to industries and 
countries. Sanjaya Lall, in a survey (Lall 1992), emphasized three aspects of “national 
technological capability” as he phrased it; the ability to muster the necessary (financial) 
resources and use them efficiently; skills, including not only general education but also 
specialized managerial and technical competence; and what he called “national technological 
effort”, which he associated with measures such as R&D, patents and technical personnel.
4  
                                                 
2 Gerschenkron’s work is often associated with his focus on investment banks, which he saw as critical in 
mobilizing resources for development. However, as Shin (1996) points out, it is possible to see his writings as an 
attempt to arrive at a more general  understanding of the conditions for catch-up, focusing on the  instruments - 
or capabilities to use a more recent term -  that need to be in place for successful catch-up to take place.   
3 Other concepts used in the literature to characterize these requirements include  “technological mastery” 
(Dahlman and Westphal 1981,  Fransman 1982),  “technological  effort”  (Dahlman and Westphal 1982), 
“technological capacity” (Bell 1984), “innovative activity” (Fagerberg 1987), “innovation capability” (Dahlman 
et al. 1987), “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levintal 1990), “innovation system” (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 
1993, Edquist 1997) and “innovative capacity” (Furman et al. 2002). 
4 Lall also noted that national technological capability does not only depend on domestic technological efforts 
but also on foreign technology acquired through imports of machinery or foreign direct investments. This 
argument is also emphasized by advocates of the so-called “new growth theory” according to which small 4 
 
 
Other writers have broadened the perspective to include a wider set of  economic, social, 
cultural, institutional and political variables. Abramovitz (1986), building on earlier work by 
Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1974), used the term “social capability” as a shorthand for such 
factors. What he had in mind was not only individual skills, important as these may be, but 
also what organizations in the private and public sector are capable of doing and how this is 
supported (or hampered) by broader societal factors.  Abramovitz (1994a,b) particularly 
emphasized the importance of  managerial and technical competence; a stable and effective 
government capable of supporting economic growth;  financial institutions and markets 
capable of mobilizing capital on a large scale; and the spread of honesty and trust in the 
population.   
 
The fact that social and cultural factors such as, for example, trust may matter for economic 
development  has been widely accepted for a long time.
5 More than forty years ago Irma 
Adelman and Cynthia Morris (1965, 1967), on the basis of an in-depth study of a number of 
indicators on development for a large number of countries,  concluded  that “the purely 
economic performance of a community is strongly conditioned by the social and political 
setting in which economic activity takes place” (p. 578). They saw economic development as 
contingent on broader social and political changes accompanying the transition from a 
traditional (rural) ways of life, based on high degree of self-sufficiency, to a modern 
industrialized society characterized by market-relationships and new forms of institutions and 
governance.  More recently, in an analysis aimed at explaining the development gap between 
two Italian regions, Robert Putnam (1993) put forward the argument that this gap had to do 
with different capacities for responding to social and economic challenges through 
appropriate forms of collective action , or “social capital” as he put it, using an already 
established sociological term.
6  This contributed to a rapidly increasing body of research on 
the role of social capital in development (see Woolcock and Narayan 2000).   
 
Although the importance of such broader social and cultural factors is generally 
acknowledged, how to approach this issue empirically remains a great challenge. Adelman 
and Morris (1965, 1967), in their initial take on the issue, set out to identify (and measure) a 
wide set of indicators (twenty-two in total) of economic, social and political modernization, 
drawing on a number of different sources. The relationships between these various indicators 
were then explored through factor analysis. It was shown that the variation in the data could 
be reduced to four common factors.  T he most important  consisted of  an amalgam of 
structural factors (share of agriculture, urbanization etc.), socio-economic characteristics (role 
of middle class, social mobility, literacy etc.) and the development of mass communication 
(measured through the spread of newspapers and radios in the population).  Temple and 
Johnson (1998), who replicated the Adelman-Morris study on more recent data, suggested to 
use  this factor as a measure for what they called “social capability” (which in their view 
embraced “social capital”). They demonstrated that the measure has considerable explanatory 
                                                                                                                                                         
countries are at a disadvantage in innovation and depend on free trade and a liberal stance towards international 
capital flows in order to overcome this problem (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Coe and Helpman 1995). 
However, the empirical support for the view that “openness” to trade and FDI is an important factor behind 
developing country growth is weak (Rodrik et al. 2004, Görg and Greenaway 2004, Fagerberg and Srholec 
2008), and we are not going to consider this issue further here. 
5 For instance, Kenneth Arrow pointed out long ago that “It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by lack of mutual confidence” (Arrow 1972, p. 357). 
6 For classical texts on the subject see Bourdieu (1985) and Coleman (1990). In sociology the term is often used 
as an attribute of individuals, not as a characteristic of communities, as in the tradition from Putnam (1993). For 
an overview and discussion of different usages of the term see Portes (1998). 5 
 
power for growth  performance.    The empirical support notwithstanding,  the “SOCDEV” 
variable championed by Temple and Johnson clearly is a mixed bag, including several 
variables, such as for example indicators reflecting the structural composition of the economy,  
that has little to do with “social” factors.  Furthermore, since Adelman and Morris did their 
selection of variables, many n ew data-sources on various aspects of development have 
become available including, for example,  the “World Value Survey” (World Values Survey 
Association 2006). It seems reasonable to take these arguments into account when designing 
the analysis, which is what we wish to do in the following. We discuss this in more detail in 
the next section. 
  
3. Data and Analysis 
 
In this section we will first consider how the theoretical concepts discussed in the literature, 
e.g., technological capability, social capability and social capital, can be measured. Then we 
will go on to explore the interrelationships between technological, social, cultural, political 
etc. aspects of development through factor analysis. 
 
For the purpose of the analysis we have collected data from various sources for 40 indicators 
and 80 countries at different levels of development. Since the time series for many relevant 
indicators are short, we focus on recent evidence. In an attempt to increase coverage across 
countries and limit influence of shocks and measurement errors occurring in specific years 
most indicators are measured as five-year averages over 2000-2004. In spite of this there were 
some missing data that had to be estimated. See the appendix for details on definitions, 
sources, estimation procedure and a full listing of the countries included. 
 
What we need to do is to identify measureable aspects of the various capabilities discussed in 
the previous section and analyse how they interrelate. Technological capabilities we define, in 
the spirit of Kim (1997), as the ability to search for, create and use knowledge commercially. 
It thus includes not only the ability to create “new to the world inventions” (Furman, et al. 
2002) but also minor improvements and adaptations to local conditions, which may not be 
equally glamorous but matter a lot economically. Therefore, this covers not only “innovation” 
capabilities but also abilities related to organization, production, and commercialization, e.g., 
what Kim and others had in mind with their emphasis on the “production” and “investment” 
aspects of “technological capability”.   
 
The quality of a country’s research base is represented by publications in scientific journals, 
international patent applications (PCT) and R&D expenditure. However, as  pointed out 
above, it is not enough to be aware of technological opportunities, these also need to be 
exploited in practice, and that requires competences in production, marketing, etc. Adherence 
to quality standards (ISO) may be a good indicator in this respect. Although ISO certification 
is mainly procedural in nature, it is increasingly seen as a requirement for firms supplying 
high quality markets, and is therefore likely to reflect a high emphasis on quality in 
production. We also include three indicators of ICT use: personal computers, internet users 
and fixed/mobile phone subscribers. Although earlier studies such as Lall (1992) did not place 
much emphasis on this dimension, nowadays a well-developed ICT  infrastructure should be 
regarded as a must for a country that wish to catch up.  
  
The  important role that a country’s financial system may play in mobilizing resources for 
catching-up was pointed out already by Gerschenkron and is also emphasized by more recent 6 
 
research (see, e.g., King and Levine 1993, Levine 1997, Levine and Zervos 1998). We capture 
this aspect by the amount of credit (to the private sector) and by capitalization of companies 
listed in domestic capital markets.  Another important variable emphasized by for example 
Abramovitz, and f or which there is also solid support in the literature, is skills (Nelson and 
Phelps 1966, Barro 1991, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; for an overview see Krueger and 
Lindahl 2001). We include three indicators: gross rates of tertiary and secondary enrolment 
and the extent of public expenditure on education. 
7  
 
The quality of governance and institutions, for furnishing economic agents with incentives for 
creation and diffusion of knowledge, is generally acknowledged as being important  in the 
relevant literature. Although such factors often defy “hard” measurement, especially in a 
broad cross-country comparison, there exist some survey-based measures, often collected by 
international organisations that may throw some light on these issues. We find it useful to 
distinguish between, on the one hand, the “quality of governance” with respect to innovation 
and economic life more generally and the character of the political system on the other. For 
the former we use survey data reflecting whether property rights exist and are enforced, how 
widespread corruption is conceived to be, the extent to which law and order prevails, courts 
are seen as being independent and human rights, including women’s rights, are adhered to.  
To measure the character of the political system we include, in addition to the indicators 
mentioned above, variables reflecting the degree of democracy versus autocracy, checks and 
balances in the political system, degree of competition for posts in the executive and 
legislature, freedom of the press and the extent of political rights and civil liberties. Since 
Western democracies will tend to have high values  on most of  the latter, a  possible 
interpretation might be that what is measured here is the degree of “Westernization” of a 
country’s institutions.   
 
However, the impact of a government’s actions (as well that of private actors) may as pointed 
out by Abramovitz and others also depend on the prevailing social values in society. For 
example  lack of trust may make  many socially desirable initiatives extremely difficult to 
realize. To take this into account in the study we include data from the World Value Survey 
reflecting the degree of trust among the citizens of a nation and the willingness to participate 
in civic activities. In addition to such measures of “social capital” (see, e.g., Knack and 
Keefer, 1997)
 8 we also include variables measuring  the openness of society to people with 
different characteristics.  Arguably, the ability of a country to mobilize all parts of the 
population in economically useful activities should be seen as a very important factor in 
development.  
 
In recent years, the extent to which economic development and factors associated with it are 
conditioned by exogenous factors beyond the control of  people living today, has received 
increasing attention in the literature. Variables taken into account in such analyses include 
historical factors (Acemoglu et al. 2002), ethnic or religious diversity  (Sachs et al. 2004, 
Masters and MacMillan 2001, Bloom et al. 2003, Alesina et al. 2003) and factors related to 
geography and/or nature, such as access to sea, climate, exposure to diseases (Gallup et al. 
1999). It is difficult to deny that such exogenous factors may be important for development so 
                                                 
7 Despite detailed scrutiny we have not been able to find information on specialized managerial and technical 
skills that could be used in this study. 
8 Knack and Keefer (1997) used data from the World Value Survey to analyze the relationship between trust, 
norms of civic behaviour and membership in groups on the one hand and economic growth on the other for a 
sample of 29 (mostly developed) countries.  They found trust and civic behaviour (but not group membership) to 
be positively related to investment and economic growth.   7 
 
it seems pertinent to try to take into account. Moreover it is of interest to see if such 
exogenous factors work through the technological, political, social etc. factors taken into 
account here (by affecting capability formation) or have a separate influence (in addition to 
other factors). We therefore include a selected set of indicators for such exogenous factors in 
the factor analysis. Historical factors refer to choices taken by people in the past that influence 
present outcomes whether people living today like it or not. We include the extent to which 
the country has experienced armed conflicts in recent decades and the demographic 
composition of its population. Another set of factors that also may be seen as historical in 
nature refers to religion. For this we include the shares of the major religions in the 
population. Regarding geography we include the average distance for a country’s population 
to the sea or navigable rivers, the exposure to natural disasters and the share of its area in the 
tropics. We also include the prevalence of various serious diseases that are, at least to some 
extent, associated with a country’s geography, nature and climate (malaria, tuberculosis and 
HIV). 
 
Table 1 outlines the indicators taken into account and provides results of the factor analysis. 
Three principal  factors emerge from the analysis, explaining together 61.8  % of the total 
variance of the indicators. The first of these is strongly correlated with indicators reflecting 
R&D, patenting & scientific publications, ICT access/use, a well developed financial sector, 
little corruption
9, law and order, a well functioning legal system and a set of variables drawn 
from the World Value survey reflection the openness of society towards parts of population 
with diverging characteristics, trust and the propensity to take part in civic activities. It also 
loads highly on the share of Protestants in the population and moderately on education and 
human rights (see below). Hence this factor reflects both technological and social capabilities 
as  traditionally defined, emphasizing the strong interdependence between technological, 
social and cultural factors in the process of development. We have chosen to continue to use 
the term “social capability” for this factor, noting,  however,  that this may be seen as a 
broadening of the definition.  
 
The second factor  correlates highly with the adoption of western-type institutions in the 
political sphere, a high share of Catholics, a low share of Muslims and  moderately with 
women’s rights. This factor clearly reflects the prevalence of Western values and institutions 
and we therefore call it “Western democracy”. Finally there is a third factor that correlates 
strongly with  the fertility rate, spread of malaria, tuberculosis and HIV and location in the 
tropics. It correlates moderately with a number of other factors too, the most important of 
which are  (low shares of)  tertiary and secondary school enrolment. This factor  arguably 
reflects some of the mechanisms that continue to keep the poorest countries of the world at 
the bottom of the development ladder. We label this factor “the poverty trap”. 
  
                                                 
9 Note that the corruption perception index, as explained in appendix, ranges from zero (high corruption) to ten 
(no corruption). 8 
 
  Table 1: Results of factor analysis (factor loadings) 
  Factor 1:  Factor 2:  Factor 3: 





 trap  
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D  0.84  -0.03  -0.05 
PCT international (patent) applications  0.90  -0.02  0.11 
Science & engineering articles  0.92  0.05  -0.03 
ISO 9000 certifications  0.59  0.10  -0.15 
Personal computers  0.87  0.07  -0.07 
Internet users  0.79  0.14  -0.15 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers  0.64  0.22  -0.33 
Tertiary school enrolment  0.41  0.16  -0.47 
Secondary school enrolment  0.38  0.21  -0.51 
Public expenditure on education  0.54  -0.01  -0.05 
Domestic credit to private sector  0.75  -0.03  -0.01 
Market capitalization of listed companies  0.78  -0.05  0.17 
Corruption perception index  0.86  0.08  -0.13 
Law and order  0.70  -0.20  -0.32 
Impartial courts  0.89  -0.10  0.05 
Property rights  0.69  0.26  -0.12 
Physical integrity human rights  0.39  0.23  -0.41 
Women’s rights  0.46  0.47  -0.16 
Equal rights to a job for immigrants  0.70  -0.04  0.03 
Acceptance of homosexuality  0.61  0.35  -0.08 
Tolerance and respect for other people  0.57  0.13  0.14 
Trust  0.68  -0.43  -0.15 
Civic action  0.61  0.13  -0.10 
Political rights and civil liberties  0.23  0.79  -0.12 
Freedom of the press  0.39  0.65  -0.07 
Index of democracy and autocracy  0.03  0.88  -0.09 
Political constraint  0.11  0.65  -0.05 
Executive index of political competitiveness  -0.11  0.84  0.10 
Legislative index of political competitiveness  -0.12  0.78  0.06 
Protestant  0.81  0.10  0.43 
Catholic  -0.26  0.56  -0.07 
Muslim  -0.12  -0.61  -0.02 
Fertility  0.11  -0.26  0.75 
HIV prevalence  0.11  0.09  0.65 
Tuberculosis prevalence  -0.14  0.02  0.80 
Malaria fatal risk  0.06  -0.02  0.86 
Land in geographical tropics  -0.12  0.12  0.67 
Population within 100 km of ice-free coast  0.15  0.27  -0.32 
Killed or affected by natural disasters  -0.31  0.00  0.42 
Armed conflicts  -0.21  0.07  0.30 
 
Note: Number of observations is 80; three factors with eigenvalue > 1 were detected, which explain 61.8% of 






Figures 1 -3  show the r elationships between the three synthetic  measures  and economic 
development. Figure 1 plots our social capability measure against GDP per capita (PPP).  One 
observation follows more or less immediately:  the very close correlation between the two.  
More than eighty per cent of the variation in GDP per capita  can be “explained” by the 
broadly defined social  capability measure. Arguably  developing such capabilities  must be 
seen as a “must” for countries that wish to catch up.  Figure 2 presents the same for “Western 
democracy”. As is evident from the graph this relationship is non-linear.
10 For the poorest 
countries there is either a negative or no relationship a t all between the degree of 
westernization of institutions and economic development, depending on whether or not Saudi 
Arabia is  included in the analysis. For the richer part of the sample the curve is almost 
vertical, indicating that they all have western-type institutions independent of the level of  
GDP per capita. Only for a relatively small number of medium-income countries we find 
evidence of a p ositive relationship. A possible explanation of this pattern could be that 
democratization is a consequence rather than a cause of economic development but this is not 
something that we can conclusively test for with the present data.  
 
Finally Figure 3 reports the relationship between GDP per capita and “The poverty trap”. In 
this case too the best fit is a non-linear relationship.
11 As in the previous case this factor has 
no predictive power with respect to differences in GDP per capita among already developed 
countries. But it has considerable explanatory potential for a limited number of poor countries 
in Africa and Asia. Arguably these are countries caught in “the poverty trap”. The combined 
effect of high fertility rates, low education and high frequency of serious disease leads to a 
“vicious circle” that prevents these mostly tropical countries to escape from poverty.   
 
Most of the eleven indicators referring to geography, demography and history factor out in the 
separate “The poverty trap” dimension. But this does not hold for religion, the influence of 
which is also notable for the two other principal  factors. As pointed out, social capability – 
which has the strongest correlation with economic development  – is  strongly  positively 
correlated with the spread of Protestantism. This seems to fit the arguments of Max Weber 
(1905/2002) regarding the important r ole that religious attitudes and beliefs may play for 
development (or lack of such). However, as the reader may have observed, Protestantism is 
also positively (though more moderately) correlated with factors associated with “The poverty 
trap”. Furthermore, the shares of Catholics and Muslims are both correlated with “Western 
democracy”, though in opposite directions.  But since the economic significance of the spread 
of “Western democracy” seems small, this does not necessarily have big implications for 
development. Thus, while the results indicate that religion may be an important variable to 





                                                 
10A quadratic function (y = 10.00 + 9.21x + 2.98x
2) comes out with a higher R
2 = 0.37 than a linear function (y = 
12.92 + 5.41x)  with R² = 0.27. 
11 A quadratic function (y = 10.85 - 9.37x + 2.21x
2) comes out with a higher R
2 = 0.39 than a linear function (y = 
12.92 - 6.03x) with R² = 0.33. 10 
 
Figure 1: Social capability and GDP per capita (PPP) 
 
 



















While many writers over the years have emphasized the large potential for development by 
adopting more advanced technologies developed elsewhere, this potential  has been slow to 
materialize. The natural question to ask, therefore, is why such catching up, which in the 
views of some should be easy, seems to be so difficult in practice. One possibility, which has 
received a lot of attention in the literature, is that catching up in technology does not come for 
free but requires the generation of what has been called “technological capabilities”, e.g., the 
ability of a country to acquire, exploit and develop new knowledge.  In this paper we have 
taken the issue one step further by investigating the possibility that such technological 
capabilities, to lead to development, needs to be accompanied by a broader set of “social 
capabilities” reflecting not only the provision of education, quality of governance etc. but also 
the spread of values, beliefs and institutions that encourage members of society to actively 
contribute to the development process. As shown in the paper there are strong reasons to 
believe that this actually is the case.  In addition, some (mostly tropical) countries are also 
negatively affected by a powerful “vicious circle” of high fertility rates, low education and 
high frequency of serious disease, which  hamper capability building and  contributes to 
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Appendix 1: Data and sources 
 
A brief overview of definitions, sources and coverage of the indicators is given in the table 
below. The main source of data is the World Bank (World Development Indicators 2005), 
which combines various sources of data for a large sample of countries. The database has 
been complemented by data from other organizations such as UNCTAD (FDI Database), 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest) OECD (MSTI and Patent Databases), International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO),  Heritage Foundation,  Transparency International, 
Freedom House, World Value Survey and others, and in addition datasets produced by 
research projects or scholars. National sources were only used for Taiwan if necessary and in 
a few cases for R&D data in developing countries. 
 
Although the selected indicators have broad coverage, in  many cases there were missing 
values for a few countries that had to be dealt with. We use the impute procedure in Stata 9 to 
fill in the missing values (see the Stata 9 Manual f or details). In each case we based the 
estimation on data for other indicators in the dataset. The number of countries with estimated 
data for each indicator is given in the last column of the following table. It should be stressed 
that considerable care was taken to check the estimated data against observed figures. In some 
cases the estimated data would exceed the maximum (or minimum) observed value of an 
indicator elsewhere. In such cases we truncated the data by replacing the estimated values by 
the maximum (or minimum) observed figure. Note that we also reversed the scale, while 
keeping the original range, for some of the governance indicators in order to have the 
indicator in increasing order (with low value signalling weak governance and vice versa).  
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GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international USD): 
Gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.  
USD 
World Bank (World  Development 
Indicators 2005)  2000-2004  0 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD): 
Total (public and private) intramural expenditure on research and experimental development 
(R&D) performed on the national territory.  
% of GDP 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005), OECD (MSTI 
Database), RICYT and national 
sources 
2000-2004  9 
PCT international (patent) applications: 
Number of applications for PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) patents. 
per capita  WIPO  2000-2004  0 
Science & engineering articles: 
Number of scientific and engineering articles published in journals covered by the Institute for 
Scientific Information’s Science Citation and Social Sciences Citation Indexes. 
per capita 
U.S. National Science Foundation 
(Science and Engineering Indicators 
2006) 
2000-2003  0 
ISO 9000 certifications:  
ISO 9000 is a family of standards approved by the International Standards Organization (ISO) 
that define a quality management and quality assurance program. 
per capita 
International Organization for 
Standardization (The ISO Survey, 
various issues) 
2000-2003  0 
Personal computers: 
Personal computers are self-contained computers designed to be used by a single individual. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005) 
2000-2004  2 
Internet users:  
Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005)  2000-2004  0 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers:  
Fixed lines are telephone mainlines connecting a customer's equipment to the public switched 
telephone network. Mobile phone subscribers refer to users of portable telephones subscribing 
to an automatic public mobile telephone service using cellular technology. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005)  2000-2004  0 
Tertiary school enrolment:  
Number of tertiary students of all ages expressed as a percentage of the tertiary school-age 
population. 
% gross 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest 
2005 CD-Rom )  2000-2002  1 
Secondary school enrolment:  
Number of secondary students of all ages expressed as a percentage of the secondary school-
age population. 
% gross 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest 
2005 CD-Rom )  2000-2002  1 
Public expenditure on education: 
Public spending on public education plus subsidies to private education at the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary levels. 
% of GDP 
UNESCO (Global Education Digest 
2005 CD-Rom ) 
2000-2002  7 
Domestic credit to private sector: 
Financial resources provided to the private sector that establish a claim for repayment. 
% of GDP 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005) 
2000-2004  0 19 
 
Market capitalization of listed companies:  
Market capitalization is the share price times the number of shares outstanding of domestically 
incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
% of GDP 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005)  2000-2004  5 
Corruption perception index: 
The perceptions of well-informed people with regard to the extent of corruption, defined as the 




(Corruption Perceptions Index; 
various issues) 
2000-2004  0 
Law and order: 
Rule of law and order is the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the 
established institutions, to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. 
index  
(0 to 10) 
PRS Group (International Country 
Risk Guide, various issues)  2000-2004  3 
Impartial courts: 
The variable indicates whether a trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to 
challenge the legality of government actions or regulation.  
index  
(0 to 10) 
World Economic Forum (Global 
Competitiveness Report, various 
issues) 
2000-2003  6 
Property rights: 
The degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its 
government enforces those laws. The scale of the indicator has been reversed into increasing 
order, while keeping its original range. 
index  
(1 to 5) 
Heritage Foundation (Index of 
Economic Freedom, various issues)  2000-2004  0 
Physical integrity human rights: 
The variable is average score on a group of four rights known as the “physical integrity rights 
“:  rights to freedom from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and political 
imprisonment. 
index  
(0 to 8) 
Cingranelli and Richards (2004)  2000-2004  0 
Women’s rights: 
The variable is average score on women’s economic, political and social rights.  
index  
(0 to 9) 
Cingranelli and Richards (2004)  2000-2004  0 
Equal right to a job for immigrants: 
Agreement with the following statement: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority 
to [nation] people over immigrants. Agree = 1, Neither = 2, Disagree = 3. The variable refers 
to the sum of the weighed proportions of the answers, which has been rescaled to a range 
between 0 and 100. 
index  
(0 to 100) 
World Values Survey Association 
(2006)  1999-2003  6 
Acceptance of homosexuality: 
Agreement with a statement whether homosexuality is justifiable. Answers on 10 points scale 
from “never justifiable” to “always justifiable”. The variable refers to the sum of the weighed 
proportions of the answers, which has been rescaled to a range between 0 and 100. 
index  
(0 to 100) 
World Values Survey Association 
(2006)  1999-2003  5 
Tolerance and respect for other people: 
Agreement with the statement that tolerance and respect for other people is an important 
quality that children should be encouraged to learn at home. 
% 
World Values Survey Association 
(2006)  1999-2003  3 
Trust: 
Agreement with the following statement: Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
% 
World Values Survey Association 
(2006)  1999-2003  3 20 
 
Civic action: 
Answer on a question about signing a petition. Would never do = 1, Might do = 2, Have done 
= 3. The variable refers to the sum of the weighed proportions of the answers, which has been 
rescaled to a range between 0 and 100. 
index  
(0 to 100) 
World Values Survey Association 
(2006)  1999-2003  6 
Political rights and civil liberties: 
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process. Civil liberties allow 
for the  basic  freedoms without interference from the state.  The variable is the sum of the 
indexes of political rights and civil liberties. They have been reversed into increasing order, 
while keeping their original range. 
index  
(2 to 14) 
Freedom House (Freedom in the 
World Comparative Rankings: 1973-
2005) 
2000-2004  0 
Freedom of the press: 
Freedom of the press consists of constitutional or statutory protections pertaining to the media 
and published materials The scale of the indicator has been reversed into increasing order, 
while keeping its original range. 
index  
(0 to 100) 
Freedom House (Freedom of the 
Press, various issues).  2000-2004  0 
Index of democracy and autocracy: 
Institutionalized autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. 
Institutionalized democracy is defined as one in which political participation is fully, 
competitive, executive recruitment is elective, and constraints on the chief executive are 
substantial. The variables ranges from autocracy to democracy in increasing order (Revised 
Combined Polity Score - POLITY2 variable) 
index  
(-10 to 10) 
Marshall and Jaggers (2003) - Polity 
IV Dataset  2000-2003  2 
Political constraint: 
The ex tent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in 
government policy. It identifies the number of independent branches of government with veto 
power over policy change. The measure is then modified to take into account the extent of 
alignment across branches of government and to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity 
within each legislative branch (POLCONIII variable) 
index  
(0 to 1) 
Henisz (2002, 2005)  2000-2004  0 
Executive index of political competitiveness: 
Competitiveness for post in executive branches in government, which takes into account a 
balance of power between legislature and executive, e.g. the method of the electoral college 
appointing, whether military has significant influence, whether the political system is 
presidential vs. parliamentary, etc. 
index  
(1 to 7) 
Beck, et al. (2001, 2005)  2000-2004  0 
Legislative index of political competitiveness: 
Competitiveness of elections into legislative branches. The highest score refers to countries in 
which multiple parties compete in elections and the largest party receives less than 75% of the 
vote. The lowest score refers to countries without or with unelected legislature. The score is 
supplemented by information on voting irregularities, whether candidate intimidation was 
serious enough to affect electoral outcomes, whether important parties boycott elections or the 
election results. etc. 
index  
(1 to 7) 
Beck, et al. (2001, 2005)  2000-2004  0 
Protestant: 
The proportion of population affiliated to the Protestant church 
%  CIA World Factbook  Latest year 
available  0 21 
 
Catholic: 
The proportion of population affiliated to the Catholic church 
%  CIA World Factbook  Latest year 
available  0 
Muslim: 
The proportion of population affiliated to Islam 
%  CIA World Factbook  Latest year 
available  0 
Fertility: 
Fertility rate (births per woman) represents the number of children that would be born to a 
woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance 
with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
% 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005) 
2000-2004  0 
HIV prevalence: 
The percentage of people ages 15-49 who are infected with HIV. 
% 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2005) 
2001 and 2003  0 
Tuberculosis prevalence: 
The percentage of people ages 15-49 who have developer tuberculosis. 
%  United Nations (2005)  2000-2003  0 
Malaria fatal risk: 
The estimated proportion of population at risk of contracting falciparum malaria. 
% 
Earth Institute (Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Malaria Dataset) 
1996  0 
Land in geographical tropics: 
The proportion of land area in geographical tropics. 
% 
Gallup et al. (1999) - CID Geography 
Datasets  1998  0 
Population within 100 km of ice-free coast: 
The proportion of population within 100 km from ice-free coast or navigable river buffer.  
% 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) - 
CID Geography Datasets  1994  0 
Killed or affected by natural disasters: 
Number of persons killed or affected by disasters of natural origin (droughts, earthquakes, 
extreme temperatures, floods, slides, waves, wind storms, etc.) over 1980-2004. Unity has 




UNEP (The GEO Data Portal) – 
based on the OFDA/CRED 
International Disaster Database 2004 
1980-2004  0 
Armed conflicts: 
The proportion of years when the country is location of a war; war refers to at least 1000 
battle-related deaths per year. 
%  Strand, et al. (2005)  1980-2004  0 
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Appendix 2: Overview of the factor scores by country 
 






Albania  -0.95  -0.08  -0.01 
Algeria  -1.12  -1.04  0.36 
Argentina  -0.67  0.88  0.01 
Armenia  -0.79  -0.73  0.07 
Australia  1.46  0.94  -0.60 
Austria  1.18  0.62  -1.08 
Azerbaijan  -0.86  -1.52  0.04 
Bangladesh  -1.06  -0.30  1.22 
Belarus  -0.57  -1.71  -0.80 
Belgium  1.20  0.74  -1.07 
Brazil  -0.60  0.63  0.34 
Bulgaria  -0.59  0.77  -0.73 
Canada  1.51  0.91  -0.28 
Chile  0.14  0.32  -0.29 
China  -0.25  -2.77  0.14 
Colombia  -0.92  0.13  0.87 
Croatia  -0.21  0.43  -0.67 
Czech Republic  -0.33  1.01  -0.82 
Denmark  2.33  0.30  -0.55 
Dominican Republic  -0.84  0.27  0.45 
Egypt  -0.68  -1.88  -0.25 
El Salvador  -0.93  0.41  0.46 
Estonia  0.36  0.41  -0.79 
Finland  2.20  0.69  -0.65 
France  0.84  0.89  -0.43 
Georgia  -0.88  -0.78  -0.44 
Germany  1.14  0.64  -0.57 
Greece  -0.10  0.73  -0.84 
Hungary  -0.39  0.80  -0.70 
Iceland  1.90  0.56  -0.36 
India  -0.82  0.11  1.38 
Indonesia  -1.02  -0.22  1.49 
Iran  -0.55  -1.82  -0.14 
Ireland  0.74  0.53  -0.77 
Israel  1.15  0.16  -0.27 
Italy  0.23  0.78  -1.17 
Japan  0.70  0.48  -0.58 
Jordan  -0.33  -1.79  -0.32 
Kenya  -0.74  -0.27  3.03 
Korea  0.31  0.34  -0.68 
Kyrgyzstan  -1.02  -1.17  0.01 23 
 
Latvia  -0.30  0.49  -0.93 
Lithuania  -0.51  0.75  -0.52 
Macedonia  -0.99  0.32  -0.19 
Malaysia  -0.09  -0.64  0.88 
Malta  0.04  0.75  -0.59 
Mexico  -0.83  0.76  0.33 
Moldova  -0.59  -0.20  -0.26 
Morocco  -0.70  -1.98  0.02 
Netherlands  1.96  0.36  -0.71 
New Zealand  1.49  0.63  -0.39 
Nigeria  -0.87  -0.67  2.55 
Norway  1.56  0.49  -0.61 
Pakistan  -0.75  -2.36  1.27 
Peru  -0.67  0.92  0.37 
Philippines  -0.78  0.61  1.76 
Poland  -0.36  0.64  -0.87 
Portugal  0.22  1.09  -0.93 
Romania  -0.65  0.29  -0.32 
Russia  -0.85  -0.86  0.09 
Saudi Arabia  -0.13  -3.26  0.20 
Singapore  1.16  -0.80  -0.70 
Slovakia  -0.21  0.54  -0.73 
Slovenia  0.47  0.74  -0.99 
South Africa  -0.16  0.71  1.72 
Spain  0.35  0.75  -0.73 
Sweden  2.55  0.96  -0.59 
Switzerland  2.17  0.54  -0.08 
Taiwan  0.66  0.53  -1.01 
Tanzania  -0.69  -0.19  2.48 
Thailand  -0.69  0.77  0.48 
Turkey  -0.53  -0.17  -0.42 
Uganda  -0.75  -1.19  2.94 
Ukraine  -1.07  -0.26  -0.16 
United Kingdom  1.63  0.86  -0.79 
United States  1.64  0.77  -0.17 
Uruguay  -0.59  0.94  -0.21 
Venezuela  -0.96  0.05  0.16 
Vietnam  -0.82  -1.94  1.08 
Zimbabwe  -0.52  -1.12  2.58 
 